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At the 5th Review Conference for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in November 2002, BWC States Parties agreed to “discuss and promote common understanding and effective action” on five specific issues, including “national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins.” Pathogenic microorganisms and toxins can be used for purposes prohibited by the BWC, such as the development or production of biological or toxin weapons. The reason for addressing the security and oversight of such materials is thus clear.  

In recent years, bioterrorism concerns have led a number of countries to tighten the security of pathogens and toxins under their control through the adoption of new restrictions on access to such materials.  National oversight of work with pathogens and toxins has a longer history, but has focused largely on safety issues, particularly the safety of those carrying out the work, or of the surrounding environment.  Little attention has been given to the actual work that is being undertaken with pathogens or toxins, including the possible creation of disease agents more dangerous than those that currently exist.  This is not a theoretical problem.   

In early 2001, Australia scientists reported that they had inadvertently transformed the relatively benign mousepox virus into a lethal one as part of a well-intentioned effort to develop a contraceptive for controlling the mouse population.  Last summer, American scientists demonstrated a method of synthesizing infectious polio virus from scratch, based solely on mail order DNA and genomic information available on the internet.  U.S. and other scientists also are sequencing the genome of the 1918 Spanish influenza virus, work that could lead to the recreation of the virus that killed up to 40 million people in a single year.  High consequence work such as this must be addressed.

Over the past two years, the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland has begun to develop a set of ideas for enhancing the security and oversight of high consequence work involving pathogenic microorganisms and toxins.  Our approach is based on the concept of tiered peer review, in which the level of risk determines the nature and extent of oversight requirements.  

At the foundation of our system would be a series of local review bodies.  These local bodies would be responsible for overseeing potentially dangerous activities – those that increase the potential for otherwise benign pathogens to be used as weapons.  On the next level would be national review bodies.  These national bodies would be responsible for overseeing and approving moderately dangerous activities – those that involve pathogens or toxins already identified as potential weapons threats.  At the top would be a global implementing body.  This global body would be responsible for overseeing and approving extremely dangerous activities – those that involve or could result in pathogens or toxins significantly more dangerous than those that currently exist.  

High consequence work with pathogenic microorganisms and toxins is underway throughout the world.  Effective action on the security and oversight of pathogens and toxins thus requires uniform procedures and rules across countries.  We believe that our ideas for controlling dangerous pathogens provide one possible way of achieving this important goal.  

